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From Kant to Sade: A Fragment of the History of Philosophy in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment 
 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno explain the relevance of the Second Excursus of 
their co-authored Dialectic of Enlightenment in the following way: 
 
The second excursus is concerned with Kant, Sade, and Nietzsche, whose works 
represent the implacable consumption of enlightenment. This section shows 
how the subjugation of everything natural to the sovereign subject culminates 
in the domination of what is blindly objective and natural. This tendency levels 
all the antitheses of bourgeois thought, especially that between moral rigor and 
absolute amorality. (DA, 21-22; DE, xviii)1 
 
From this passage the Second Excursus can be taken to illustrate how the dialectic of 
enlightenment develops in such a way as to result in the opposite of enlightenment’s own 
fundamental goal of removing domination, whether it concerns the domination exercised by 
human beings in relation to one another or the domination of human beings by natural forces. 
Enlightenment rationality proves to be self-undermining because reason itself and the human 
beings whom it is meant to liberate by means of the domination of nature become subject to 
forces to which reason must simply accommodate itself. This outcome anticipates how 
individuals have become subject to blind, quasi-natural economic and social forces in capitalist 
modernity and under Fascism. In addition, this outcome has resulted in the abolition of any 
                                                          
1 I use the following abbreviations of writings whose full bibliographical details are provided in the list of 
references:  
AA = Kant, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften  
CJ = Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment 
CPR = Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft/Critique of Pure Reason  
DA = Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung  
DE = Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment 
KCPR = Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
KKrV = Adorno, Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
LHP = Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825-6, Volume I.  
VGP = Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 1. 
WE = Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’  
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objective moral differences. For how can such differences be rationally explained in terms of 
blind forces whose authority stems only from the fact that they have proven to be more 
powerful vis-à-vis other forces? In connection with how blind natural drives have come to 
govern human behaviour, Horkheimer and Adorno answer that no such explanation is possible: 
‘Enlightened reason no more possesses the means of measuring one drive within itself against 
others than of ordering the universe into spheres’ (DA, 114; DE, 71).  
The idea that enlightenment rationality undermines its fundamental aims and ideals 
requires showing that this form of rationality does indeed contain the seeds of this self-
undermining of its own aims and ideals. This suggests that in the case of the Second Excursus 
of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno must seek to establish an essential 
connection between Kant’s philosophy, which exemplifies enlightenment rationality, and the 
next stage in their attempt to illustrate the dialectic of enlightenment. This next stage concerns 
certain ideas and principles of action that find expression in the novels of the Marquis de Sade. 
To excuse the absence of any demonstration of an essential connection between Kant’s 
philosophy and the novels of Sade by an appeal to the historical context in which the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment was written, and with which the text itself engages, or on similar grounds, 
must, therefore, be considered unsatisfactory. This line of defence in any case begs the question, 
by assuming that Horkheimer and Adorno do not attempt to demonstrate any such connection.  
I shall attempt to explain Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of the essential connection 
between Kant’s philosophy and the relevant ideas and principles of action encountered in 
Sade’s novels, by arguing that for them Sade’s novels make explicit the practical implications 
of key aspects of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, in the sense of what it would mean for the 
aspects of reason in question to be embodied in principles of action and in human practices. In 
this way, I show that Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of the transition from Kant’s 
philosophy to Sade’s novels in the Second Excursus of the Dialectic of Enlightenment is not as 
arbitrary as it may well appear to the reader. First, though, with reference to the idea of a 
‘history of philosophy’, I want to say something about the nature of the connection that 
Horkheimer and Adorno seek to establish.  
 
The Second Excursus as fragment of the history of philosophy 
An attempt to write a systematic history of philosophy that, for reasons shortly to be explained, 
is relevant to the Second Excursus of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, is to be found in Hegel’s 
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lectures on the history of philosophy. 2 For Hegel, the history of philosophy ought not to be the 
narration of a random succession of philosophical standpoints and theories. Rather, the 
standpoints and theories that form the objects of this history are to be presented as ‘distinct but 
necessary stages in the development of reason as it comes to consciousness of itself’ (VGP, 
226; LHP, 58). The history of philosophy must, moreover, aim to comprehend the whole 
process through which reason progressively achieves self-consciousness, by showing how each 
stage represents an essential moment of the unfolding of reason. It can fulfil this aim by 
exhibiting the inner necessity that connects each stage in the development of reason with the 
previous one, and the most recent philosophy (in this case Hegel’s own philosophy), by 
comprehending and uniting the earlier stages, will be ‘the richest and most concrete philosophy, 
containing all the earlier philosophical principles within itself, although only as elements that 
previously presented themselves as the whole’ (VGP, 228; LHP, 60). Thus, the concept of 
reason is both the object and the end of the history of philosophy. Horkheimer and Adorno do 
not appeal to the idea of a higher end towards which the history of philosophy is moving. Their 
account of the transition from Kant’s philosophy to the novels of Sade can nevertheless be 
thought to exhibit the following key features of Hegel’s idea of a history of philosophy: 
 
(1) The idea that there is some kind of essential connection between one stage 
in the history of reason and the next one which must be brought to light. Since, 
for Hegel, the object of the history of philosophy is the history of reason, we 
might think of Horkheimer and Adorno as seeking to provide a fragment of the 
history of philosophy in a Hegelian sense by attempting to demonstrate the inner 
necessity which connects Kant’s philosophy and the novels of Sade and 
explaining this necessity in terms of the concept of reason. 
 
(2) The idea that the history of philosophy concerns the development of ‘but 
one reason’ [nur Eine Vernunft] (VGP, 220; LHP, 54). In the Second Excursus, 
Horkheimer and Adorno speak of a concept of reason whose subjects are ‘the 
bearers of one and the same reason’ (DA, 106; DE, 65). Even if they do not 
operate with a single, unitary concept of reason in the strict sense of a concept 
                                                          
2 The claim that key features of Hegel’s idea of a history of philosophy can be detected in the Second Excursus 
should not be confused with the claim that the Dialectic of Enlightenment viewed as a whole contains some kind 
of history of philosophy. 
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of reason that can be reduced to one fundamental property or principle,3 we shall 
see that their account of the transition from Kant’s philosophy to the novels of 
Sade concerns the idea of a reason whose various modes of theoretical 
employment find practical expression in Sade’s novels. The employment of 
theoretical reason assumes the following forms: the synthetic and instrumental 
activity of the understanding; speculative reason’s search for increasing 
systematic unity; and a critical form of rationality that not only examines claims 
to truth, but also seeks to prevent the illegitimate extension of the use of 
speculative reason 
 
(3) We can speak of a history of philosophy in the Hegelian sense also because 
the Second Excursus of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, by showing how Sade 
develops the practical implications of the reason whose employment not only 
forms the object of Kant’s theoretical philosophy but is also the instrument of 
philosophical inquiry and critique, makes reason as it has manifested itself 
historically into an object of critical reflection. Thus, in the Second Excursus, 
we encounter an attempt to explain, to use Hegel’s words, ‘the development of 
reason as it comes to consciousness of itself’. 
 
(4) The idea that the history of philosophy is not only concerned with something 
past. Reason, as the object of the history of philosophy, and the particular ideas 
and principles in which reason finds concrete expression, are present to us and 
inform our thinking and actions at the point of history which we ourselves 
occupy and from which we survey the history of philosophy. This is because 
these ideas and principles have shaped our self-understanding and our collective 
understanding of the world, thereby determining the social and political spheres 
as well as the spheres of culture and religion. Although philosophy is only one 
manifestation of the ‘spirit’ of an age, philosophy possesses, for Hegel, the 
                                                          
3 There is, however, one sense in which they think that all the forms of reason which they introduce in connection 
with Kant’s philosophy, that is, critical reason, instrumental reason and speculative reason, are unified, namely, 
in virtue of their common subjection to the rules of logic, which demand that concepts be developed and linked 
in ways that avoid contradiction: ‘The laws of logic establish the most universal relationships within the order and 
define them. Unity lies in self-consistency. The principle of contradiction is the system in nuce’ (DA, 104; DE, 
63). See also KKrV, 27-28; KCPR, 14. 
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privileged status of the clearest mode of spirit’s self-knowledge (VGP, 236-238; 
LHP, 66-67). The object of the history of philosophy, that is to say, reason, is 
consequently something present with which, as Hegel puts it, ‘we as thinking 
beings … have to deal [zu tun haben]’ (VGP, 231; LHP, 62). For Horkheimer 
and Adorno, this means dealing with enlightenment reason’s responsibility for 
how ‘the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity’ (DA, 
25; DE, 1).   
 
There are two features of this relation of the Second Excursus of the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
to the Hegelian idea of a history of philosophy that I would now briefly like to highlight. 
 
(1) In seeking to show that Kant’s philosophy has practical implications that 
become manifest in certain ideas and principles of action that can be detected in 
Sade’s novels, and which can in turn be related to key features of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, Horkheimer and Adorno develop a novel account of the history of 
philosophy. This version of the history of post-Kantian philosophy goes from 
Kant through Sade to Nietzsche, rather than offering the more traditional type 
of presentation that proceeds from Kant through German Idealism and 
Schopenhauer to Nietzsche.  
 
(2) If one is willing to grant Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment the status of a philosophical text, the historical distance that 
separates today’s reader of this work from some of its earlier readers, who found 
themselves situated in the cultural, intellectual, social and political environment 
with which the text engages, allows us to situate it itself in the history of 
philosophy. Is this not evident from how we seek to locate the text not only in 
relation to the writings of earlier philosophers or social theorists but also in 
relation to later ones, and from how we try to place it in its own historical 
context which, now that it is no longer immediately present to us, is not treated 
as self-evident? 
 
These two general features of the Second Excursus of the Dialectic of Enlightenment can in 
turn be related in different ways to Horkheimer and Adorno’s aim of offering an internal 
critique of enlightenment reason. The idea that enlightenment rationality, when judged in 
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accordance with standards that its own representatives have set up, must be thought to 
undermine itself, demands showing that this form of rationality does indeed contain the seeds 
of the destruction of its own aims and ideals. At the very least, therefore, the Second Excursus 
must render intelligible the way in which the dialectic of enlightenment is exemplified by how 
Kant’s philosophy, which is taken to be representative of enlightenment rationality, has 
practical implications that become explicit in the novels of Sade and in the philosophy of 
Nietzsche. In other words, if the Second Excursus is to provide a convincing, previously 
missing fragment of the history of philosophy, Horkheimer and Adorno must themselves adopt 
a systematic approach, in the sense of demonstrating an essential connection between Kant’s 
philosophy and the novels of Sade which can be explained in terms of the nature of 
enlightenment reason. Even if this connection does not pretend to be a strictly necessary one, 
the presentation of the transition from Kant’s philosophy to Sade’s novels must avoid the 
appearance of a narrative that lacks any internal coherence because of the disconnected nature 
of its key elements.4 In possessing a systematic dimension, however weak it may in fact be, the 
Second Excursus of the Dialectic of Enlightenment would have something in common with the 
type of Philosophiegeschichte in which Horkheimer and Adorno do not themselves claim to 
engage.  
Our position as readers of the Dialectic of Enlightenment is different, however, for 
although this text may itself provide possible material for a history of philosophy, we can, as 
readers rather than as writers of such a history, restrict ourselves to analysing and assessing its 
claims. Given what has already been said above, part of this endeavour will consist in asking 
whether there is, in fact, any kind of genuine systematic connection between Kant’s philosophy 
and the novels of Sade that can be explained in terms of enlightenment reason and how it has 
manifested itself historically. In the absence of such a connection, we may at best credit 
Horkheimer and Adorno with having developed a provocative thesis that is, however, far from 
perspicuous, let alone true. In short, for us, Horkheimer and Adorno cannot escape some of the 
responsibilities of the historian of philosophy, including the responsibility of making 
sufficiently plausible the connections that they claim exist between standpoints and theories 
                                                          
4 In the Second Excursus Horkheimer and Adorno claim that ‘only exaggeration is true’ (DA, 142; DE, 92). This 
claim is compatible with the claim that they are seeking to demonstrate an essential connection between Kant’s 
philosophy and the novels of Sade, for in this particular case it may be a matter of exaggerating those elements of 
Kant’s philosophy and Sade’s novels that allow this connection to be established in such a way that people are 
made vividly aware of it.  
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that otherwise appear fundamentally different. It would be wrong, moreover, to assume that 
Horkheimer and Adorno had no interest in doing this.  
Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of how certain ideas and principles found in Sade’s 
novels make explicit the practical implications of key aspects of Kant’s philosophy has, not 
surprisingly, been challenged. It has been argued that although Sade should indeed be granted 
a place in the history of philosophy, this history of philosophy cannot seriously be regarded as 
one that proceeds from Kant’s philosophy to the novels of Sade, with the transition in question 
being explained in terms of a common obsession with purely formal structures. It is here 
pointed out that in the case of Kant the claim that a concern with formal structures means that 
reason has no substantial goals of its own is obviously mistaken, because ‘[o]nly the hastiest 
reading of Kant’s work could miss his attack on instrumental conceptions of reason’, whereas 
for him ‘the real task of reason is precisely to set ends’ (Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, 193). 
This criticism will be shown partly to miss its target, however, by equating a purely formal 
conception of reason with instrumental reason. Moreover, even if Kant does seek to explain 
how pure practical reason is capable of setting its own unconditionally valid ends in the form 
of moral duties, and how reason is not, therefore, purely instrumental in character, Horkheimer 
and Adorno are primarily concerned with his account of theoretical reason. They in fact dismiss 
Kant’s moral theory as an example of bourgeois bad conscience, as ‘a horror of relapsing into 
barbarism’ (DA, 108; DE, 67). Therefore, if we are to judge the intelligibility of Horkheimer 
and Adorno’s account of the relation between Kant’s philosophy and the novels of Sade, we 
must begin with Kant’s account of theoretical reason. Thus, even if aspects of Kant’s moral 
philosophy do feature in the Second Excursus, any references to them must first be traced back 
to his theoretical philosophy. It is in Sade’s novels that for Horkheimer and Adorno the 
practical implications of key elements of Kant’s theoretical philosophy become explicit, 
whereas they regard Kant’s moral philosophy not only as a case of bourgeois bad conscience, 
but also as something that lacks any essential relation to the theoretical conception of reason 
encountered in the Critique of Pure Reason. Hence Horkheimer and Adorno’s statement that 
Kant’s ‘attempt to derive the duty of mutual respect from a law of reason, although more 
cautious than any other such undertaking in Western philosophy, has no support within the 
Critique’ (DA, 108; DE, 67). 5 
                                                          
5 For this reason, I find problematic the claim that Horkheimer and Adorno’s subordination of practical reason to 
theoretical reason in their account of Kant’s philosophy, which goes against the priority that Kant himself accords 
to practical philosophy, is the first and most important of their exaggerations in the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
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I shall accordingly begin with Horkheimer and Adorno’s presentation of Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy, before going on to explain how features of Sade’s novels represent the 
practical expression of key elements of the modes of employment of reason are work in it. This 
will lead me to argue (1) that Horkheimer and Adorno’s justification of the connections 
between Kant’s philosophy and the novels of Sade depends on the claim that theoretical reason 
is not purely instrumental in character but is, nevertheless, incapable of setting any ends of its 
own,  beyond the purely formal ones of organizing the material provided by intuition and 
organizing its own cognitions or principles into a systematic whole, and (2) that this claim, 
independently of any concerns about Horkheimer and Adorno’s dismissive attitude towards 
Kant’s moral philosophy,6 indicates a weakness in their account of how we get from Kant’s 
philosophy to the novels of Sade. This weakness concerns how a non-instrumental form of 
reason is ultimately not to be found in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, even where we do appear 
to encounter one.  
 
The presentation of Kant’s conception of theoretical reason in the Second Excursus 
Horkheimer and Adorno state that for Kant enlightenment consists in the employment of one’s 
understanding without the guidance of another. This statement broadly corresponds to Kant’s 
motto of enlightenment ‘[h]ave courage to make use of your own understanding’, and to his 
description of the stage of immaturity from which enlightenment frees humanity as one that 
consists in the ‘inability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction from 
another’ (AA 8 [WE]: 35). Horkheimer and Adorno proceed to link this critical rationality to a 
particular activity of reason, when they claim that the employment of the understanding 
(Verstand) is here guided by reason (Vernunft), and that this amounts to saying that the 
understanding ‘combines its individual cognitions into a system in accordance with its own 
                                                          
(see Christ, ‘Exkurs II. Juliette oder Aufklärung und Moral’). Rather, as we shall see, they want to show that there 
is, in fact no essential connection between Kant’s theoretical philosophy and his practical philosophy in so far as 
the latter makes distinctively moral claims, and that the absence of any such connection becomes explicit in Sade’s 
novels. Thus, it is not so much a matter of subordinating practical reason to theoretical reason than a matter of 
demonstrating the gulf that separates them. This does not rule out the possibility that Horkheimer and Adorno 
nevertheless exaggerate the extent of this gulf so as to make this point more forcibly. 
6 Elsewhere, however, Adorno develops some independent arguments against Kant’s moral philosophy. See 
Freyenhagen, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy, 102-120. 
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internal logic’, with the rules of reason providing ‘instructions for a hierarchical ordering of 
concepts’ (DA, 104; DE, 63).7  
Kant draws a distinction between the understanding and reason in terms of their 
respective functions and the extent of their legitimate claims to knowledge. In the 
Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, the understanding provides the 
concepts (or categories) that organize experience into a law-governed whole, by providing the 
principles of cognition that serve to unite representations which either indirectly derive from 
sensory experience through the pure forms of intuition, that is to say, space and time, or derive 
from these pure forms of intuition themselves. In the Transcendental Dialectic reason, in 
contrast, is said to transcend altogether the limits of sensory experience and any possible 
intuition in its attempts to attain complete systematic unity and closure by providing the 
complete set of conditions for any conditioned item of knowledge. I shall return to this 
important distinction between the understanding and reason. For now, however, it is enough to 
point out that this distinction does not undermine the claim that we are dealing with a 
hierarchical ordering of concepts which involves an employment of the understanding that is 
guided by reason. This can be shown with reference to some general claims that Kant makes 
in the Prefaces and Introductions to the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason.  
In the Introduction to the second edition of this work, Kant has the following to say 
about reason: ‘[R]eason is the faculty that provides the principles of cognition a priori. Hence 
pure reason is that which contains the principles for cognizing something absolutely a priori’ 
(CPR, A11/B24). The understanding and reason in the narrow sense of the object and source 
of the transcendental dialectic both concern the application of a priori principles: in the one 
case with respect to how such principles guide the synthesizing activity of the understanding 
and in the other case with respect to application of principles in the search for complete 
systematic unity and closure. The understanding and reason can therefore be classed as 
particular modes of the employment of one and the same reason, whose distinctive concern of 
reason is the identification and application of such principles. There is, however, the following 
fundamental difference between the understanding and reason in the narrower sense. The 
principles of the understanding are validated by their application, which takes the form of an 
act of synthesis, in relation to the sensory manifold that is given to the mind through the pure 
forms of intuition, space and time. Reason, in contrast, seeks to apply the same logical 
                                                          
7 For a more detailed attempt to link Kant’s concept of enlightenment to the Critique of Pure Reason, see the sixth 
of Adorno’s 1959 lectures on this text (KKrV, 91-107; KCPR, 57-68). 
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principles, ‘whose use is unavoidable in the course of experience and at the same time 
sufficiently warranted by it’, independently of any such validating intuition. In its drive to 
discover the unconditioned, reason is led to introduce its own concepts, which Kant terms 
‘transcendental ideas’. This employment of reason generates logical difficulties that reason is 
incapable of solving, because the difficulties in question ‘transcend every capacity of human 
reason’ (CPR, A vii). The essential difference between the understanding and reason is 
therefore a difference in the employment of reason understood more generally and in the 
corresponding a priori principles and concepts, with one use of reason generating successful 
cognitions in a way that the other use of reason is unable to do. These fundamental differences 
do not entail, however, that reason, understood more broadly as a faculty concerned with the 
identification and application of a priori principles, and thus as that which both guides the 
employment of the understanding and generates insoluble logical difficulties when it seeks to 
transcend the bounds of all possible experience, does not in each case seek to organize concepts 
in a hierarchical fashion. 
As regards the ordering and systematic tendencies of reason when it is understood in 
the broader sense of a faculty concerned with the identification and application of a priori 
principles, Kant claims that transcendental philosophy would amount to a system of concepts 
that make possible a priori knowledge of objects and that it thus aims at analysis of ‘the 
principles of a priori synthesis in their entire scope’ (CPR, A12/B25). Further principles can 
be derived from these principles of a priori synthesis. Transcendental philosophy thereby 
appears to open the way for a more complete system of a priori principles, in which lower 
principles are subsumed under more general ones. Thus, ‘[a]n organon of pure reason would 
be a sum total of those principles in accordance with which all pure a priori cognitions can be 
acquired and actually brought about. The exhaustive application of such an organon would 
create a system of pure reason’ (CPR, A11/B24-25). This ordering of principles of knowledge 
aims not only at completeness (‘the principles of a priori synthesis in their entire scope’) but 
also at the unification of the relevant principles as parts of one and the same interconnected 
and internally consistent whole, that is to say, a system. This demand, which as we shall see is 
only a regulative idea, follows from Kant’s characterization of the essential nature of ‘pure 
speculative reason’ which 
 
is, in respect of principles of cognition, a unity entirely separate and subsisting 
for itself, in which, as in an organized body, every part exists for the sake of all 
the others as all the others exist for its sake, and no principle can be taken with 
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certainty in one relation unless it has at the same time been investigated in its 
thoroughgoing relation to the entire use of pure reason. (CPR, B xxiii) 
 
Even at the level of the use of the understanding, therefore, a hierarchical and systematic 
ordering of its concepts is held to be possible, one that is, however, undertaken by reason rather 
than by the understanding itself. This would resemble how reason, in the narrower sense of the 
object and source of the transcendental dialectic, seeks to subsume all conditioned items of 
knowledge under the concept of something unconditioned which unifies these conditioned 
items of knowledge, thereby generating a ‘transcendental idea’, for which a validating intuition 
is this time lacking.  
Horkheimer and Adorno claim that this is an essentially formal notion of reason. 
Reason is concerned with the identification and application of a priori principles and the 
systematic ordering of such principles, while lacking any substantive content of its own. Where 
reason does appear to generate some content of its own, that is, in the form of the transcendental 
ideas, it is forced to recognize the problematic nature of such ideas, given their lack of any 
validating intuition and the logical difficulties that they generate. These ideas are reduced to 
merely regulative ones that are granted the formal function of facilitating increasing systematic 
unity with regard to a priori principles of cognition that can be validated by a corresponding 
intuition. Horkheimer and Adorno explain this purely formal form of rationality which lacks 
any substantive content of its own in terms of the critical use of reason which finds expression 
in Kant’s motto of enlightenment. This explanation of the reduction of reason to something 
that is purely formal in nature appeals to the corrosive effects of the critical use of reason and, 
in particular, the radical suspicion of the mere idea of any kind of substantive content whose 
truth can be demonstrated: 
 
Reason contributes nothing but the idea of systematic unity, the formal elements 
of fixed conceptual relationships. Any substantial objective [Ziel] which might 
be put forward as a rational insight is, according to the Enlightenment in its 
strict sense, delusion, falsehood, “rationalization,” no matter what pains 
individual philosophers may take to steer us away from this conclusion and 
toward a reliance on philanthropic feeling. (DA, 105; DE, 64) 
 
One can call this claim ‘the purely formal nature of reason claim’. The claim that reason is 
purely formal in nature, when applied to the Critique of Pure Reason, is in one sense clearly 
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false. This is because reason, in its critical function of examining the limits of its own capacity 
to know objects, has itself as its object and is, in this sense at least, not without its own content. 
Horkheimer and Adorno, however, are concerned with a specific type of content, namely, ends 
or purposes. The claim that reason is purely formal in virtue of how the lack of any substantive 
content of its own results from how the critical employment of reason undermines the mere 
idea of any such content, should, therefore, be taken to mean the absence of any ends or 
purposes that are internal to reason.8 One might, therefore, think of Horkheimer and Adorno 
as claiming that there is no way of explaining in purely conceptual terms how we can get from 
Kant’s theoretical philosophy to the idea of a pure practical reason that is capable of generating 
its own content. Any ends that practical reason adopts will instead be external to reason, and 
thus not ‘pure’, reducing reason to a means of achieving given ends, that is to say, to a purely 
instrumental form of rationality.  
To understand why Horkheimer and Adorno make the claim that reason is incapable of 
generating any ends of its own, and that it must therefore function as an instrument in 
connection with ends that are external to it, we need to think of them as posing something like 
the following question: why does reason, in the form of the understanding, perform the 
synthesizing function that Kant attributes to it? Now, one might object that such a question 
cannot be meaningfully posed, in that it is simply the case that the human mind performs this 
function, whereas if did not do this, a unified experience of the world and the objects within it 
would not be possible at all, and so one could not, therefore, even pose such a question. Yet if 
one were to pose this question, one might well come to answer it in something like the 
following way: the knowledge which is thereby made possible ultimately concerns the 
conditions of biological survival, for this knowledge turns out to be the basis of all knowledge 
that enables us to orientate ourselves in the world.9 Theoretical reason does not, and cannot, 
however, specify the determinate ends in accordance with which we seek to orientate ourselves 
within world. Rather, it identifies and applies only the minimal, most general conditions by 
means of which the human mind organizes its experience of the world and is thereby able to 
                                                          
8 For Kant, it is, of course, the task of pure practical reason, not theoretical reason, to generate such ends. This is 
evidence of the extent to which Horkheimer and Adorno dismiss the central claims of Kant’s moral philosophy 
which, as we have seen, are explained by them in mainly sociological terms.  
9 See Gottschlich, ‘The Necessity and Limits of Kant’s Transcendental Logic, with Reference to Nietzsche and 
Hegel’, 303. 
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act effectively in it, though this is not to say reason necessarily provides the most effective 
means of doing this.  
Horkheimer and Adorno could here appeal to Kant’s own claim that the validity of the 
principles of the understanding is confirmed, and thus validated, by their application to an 
experiential content which these principles in turn render possible, in the sense of organizing 
the intuited manifold in such a way as to transform it into a possible object of knowledge 
(‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’ [CPR, A51/B75]). 
When this claim is taken together with how the end of reason, in so far as its concerns the 
understanding, ultimately appears to be biological survival, the validity of the principles of the 
understanding appears to be demonstrated by how systematic knowledge proves to be 
compatible not only with modern physics but also with everyday praxis. One can call this claim 
‘the confirmation by experience claim’. Ultimately, then, the demand to validate the a priori 
principles of the understanding by demonstrating their application to experience finds practical 
expression in the demand that knowledge serve as an effective means of mastering nature in 
accordance with human ends. Thus, in so far as it does become practical, reason assumes the 
form of instrumental reason. In this way, the validity of philosophical critique is itself made to 
depend on its ability to justify the fundamental principles of all knowledge by demonstrating 
how these principles possess an explanatory and predictive value in relation to the given, purely 
natural end of self-preservation:  
 
A thinking which fails to maintain agreement between system and intuition 
[Anschauung] does not merely violate isolated visual impressions; it conflicts 
with real praxis. Not only does the expected event fail to occur but the 
unexpected happens: the bridge collapses, the crop fails, the medicine causes 
illness. The spark which most conclusively indicates a lack of systematic 
thinking, a violation of logic, is not a fleeting perception but sudden death. The 
system which enlightenment aims for is the form of knowledge which most ably 
deals with the facts, most effectively assists the subject in mastering nature. The 
system’s principles are those of self-preservation. Immaturity amounts to the 
inability to survive. (DA, 106; DE, 64-5; translation modified) 
 
To sum up, when taken together the purely formal nature of reason claim and the confirmation 
by experience claim generate the further claim that nature will be dominated in accordance 
with an end that is itself purely formal. The end in question is that of self-preservation, which 
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Horkheimer and Adorno accordingly describe as ‘the constitutive principle of science, the soul 
of the table of categories’ (DA, 109; DE, 68). The end of physical survival is purely formal in 
that it represents a necessary condition of having ends at all, but does not itself determine either 
what these ends are, beyond the purely natural ends connected with the desire for self-
preservation, or what they ought to be.10 This is, in effect, to make the maintenance of the 
capitalist mode of production together with accommodation to its requirements into the end of 
reason, because this mode of production has become the condition of individual self-
preservation in modern society. As an economic system governed by a purely formal, 
instrumental form of rationality, capitalism is, moreover, that which unites individuals who, 
compelled by the desire for self-preservation, engage in acts of cooperation that establish 
merely external relations between them. At the same time, each individual is functionally 
replaceable by other individuals in the modern division of labour:  
 
                                                          
10 The way in which I identify self-preservation with the preservation of the individual as a purely biological entity 
might be said to run counter to Horkheimer and Adorno’s concern with the preservation of the psychic unity of 
the subject. This unity is presupposed by the idea of the subject associated with Kant’s concept of the synthetic 
unity of apperception. This is the unity of the subject that, with the aid of the categories, unifies its representations, 
which requires that it is able to recognize these representations as its own representations and to do so in the course 
of time, which entails the self-identity of this subject. I have two responses to this potential criticism. First of all, 
the examples to which Horkheimer and Adorno appeal in one of the key passages that I have cited clearly concern 
material threats to physical survival (‘the bridge collapses, the crop fails, the medicine causes illness’). Secondly, 
self-preservation in a biological sense is a material precondition of self-preservation in a psychic sense, unless, 
that is, one wants to claim that the self could exist as a psychic entity without at the same time existing as a 
material entity. The fact that Horkheimer and Adorno see these two entities as necessarily related in existential 
terms is implied by the following statement: 
 
Even the ego [das Ich], the synthetic unity of apperception, the agency which Kant calls the 
highest point, from which the whole of logic must be suspended, is really both the product and 
the condition of material existence. Individuals, in having to fend for themselves, develop the 
ego as the agency of reflective foresight and overview; over successive generations it expands 
and contracts with the individual’s prospects of economic autonomy and productive ownership. 
(DA, 109-10; DE, 68).  
 
In other words, the extent and the strength of the ego is conditioned by the material conditions of the individual’s 
life and will therefore vary according to these same conditions. 
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[R]eason is the agency of calculating thought, which arranges the world for the 
purposes of self-preservation and recognizes no function other than that of 
working on the object as mere sense material in order to make it the material of 
subjugation. The true nature of the schematism which externally coordinates the 
universal and the particular, the concept and the individual case, finally turns 
out, in current science, to be the interest of industrial society. Being is 
apprehended in terms of manipulation and administration. Everything – 
including the individual human being, not to mention the animal – becomes a 
repeatable, replaceable process, a mere example of the conceptual models of the 
system. (DA, 106-107; DE, 65) 
 
The question as to whether this explanation of the practical implications of Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy shows that Horkheimer and Adorno have met the minimal requirements of a history 
of philosophy, however fragmentary, nevertheless remains unanswered, since we have not yet 
examined their account of the transition from Kant’s philosophy to the novels of Sade. In the 
next section, I shall attempt to explain this transition on the basis of Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
account of the nature of theoretical reason as described by Kant and with regard to the practical 
implications of this form of reason that, or so they claim, are made explicit in Sade’s novels. 
 
From Kant to Sade 
In connection with the transition from Kant’s philosophy to the novels of Sade, the 
enlightenment subject is said to become ‘the bourgeois subject freed from all tutelage’ (DA, 
109; DE, 68). Here, reason deprives itself of any substantive content in the form of ends that 
are internal to it through its relentless unmasking of the untruth of any claims concerning such 
ends. Thus, we arrive at the purely formal nature of reason claim by means of the corrosive 
effects of the purely critical employment of reason. The outcome is essentially the same, 
moreover, in that, through being deprived of any substantial content of its own, reason is 
reduced to the instrument of given natural ends that it then seeks to legitimize, instead of being 
the sovereign authority that it takes itself to be:  
 
Because it unmasks substantial goals as asserting the power of nature over mind 
and as curtailing its own self-legislation, reason, as a purely formal entity, is at 
the service of every natural interest. Becoming simply an organ, thinking reverts 
to nature. (DA, 110; DE, 68)  
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Horkheimer and Adorno go on to suggest that this purely formal rationality can, in fact, cease 
altogether to concern itself with determinate ends. Instead, reason engages in the activities of 
calculation, planning and organization simply for their own sake, and thereby concerns itself 
with what were previously merely means, but now not as means but as ends in themselves. It 
is here that we encounter a claim that is key to Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of the 
transition from Kant’s philosophy to the novels of Sade, and which, despite how Kant’s 
conception of theoretical reason is otherwise associated with an instrumental rationality, 
implies the existence of a non-instrumental, but nevertheless amoral or even immoral, formal 
conception of reason:  
 
Reason is the organ of calculation, of planning; it is neutral with regard to ends; 
its element is coordination. More than a century before the emergence of sport, 
Sade demonstrated empirically what Kant grounded transcendentally: the 
affinity between knowledge and planning which has set its stamp of inescapable 
functionality on a bourgeois existence rationalized even in its breathing spaces. 
The precisely coordinated modern sporting squad, in which no member is in 
doubt over his role and a replacement is held ready for each, has its exact 
counterpart in the sexual teams of Juliette, in which no moment is unused, no 
body orifice neglected, no function left inactive ... The special architectonic 
structure of the Kantian system, like the gymnasts’ pyramids in Sade’s orgies 
and the formalized principles of early bourgeois freemasonry – cynically 
reflected in the strict regime of the libertine society of the 120 Days of Sodom – 
prefigures the organization, devoid of any substantial goals, which was to 
encompass the whole of life. What seems to matter in such events, more than 
pleasure itself, is the busy pursuit of pleasure, its organization; just as in other 
demythologized epochs, imperial Rome, the Renaissance, and the Baroque, the 
schema of activity counted for more than its content. (DA, 111; DE, 69)  
 
Here planning and the formal organizational activity of reason more generally have become 
ends in themselves (‘[w]hat seems to matter … is the busy pursuit of pleasure, its 
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organization’). 11  Reason is therefore no longer concerned merely with the successful 
identification and application of the means to ends that are external to it, such as the production 
of pleasurable sensations. This purely formal activity of reason, which has become an end in 
itself, finds its theoretical expression in the systematic drive of pure speculative reason 
identified by Kant (‘[t]he special architectonic structure of the Kantian system’) which finds 
practical expression in the complex, elaborate, but essentially pointless and pleasureless ways 
in which the orgies described by Sade are organized. The purely formal nature of reason claim 
remains in play, because reason lacks any determinate content of its own. Its end is instead 
simply its own activity. With respect to content, all that matters to reason is that it has a given 
content to organize. This content is the means that allows reason to engage in an activity that 
has become end in itself, and to this extent instrumental reason plays a subordinate role. What 
the content in question actually is, however, is a matter of indifference to reason, which can 
engage in its formal organizing activity equally as well in relation to one end and its 
corresponding material as in relation to another end and its corresponding material (‘it is neutral 
with regard to ends’). Reason’s engagement in a form of activity purely for its own sake means 
that the employment of reason here essentially differs from how reason, in so far it guides the 
employment of the understanding, performs a synthesizing function whose ultimate goal is 
self-preservation.  
The type of rationality at work can even be said to exhibit a type of non-moral 
disinterestedness, because reason engages in the activity of organizing the available material 
without being driven to do so by any material interest or other external end that it has an interest 
in realizing. Therefore, if such a conception of theoretical reason is found in Kant’s philosophy, 
it would anticipate his conception of pure practical reason as the capacity to set oneself ends, 
in the form of moral duties, independently of any material desires and interests. Although 
reason may have advanced beyond a purely instrumental form of rationality, and to this extent 
might be thought to escape the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’, in the case before us reason’s 
ultimate indifference to content and the purely formal nature of its end means that it lacks both 
an unconditionally valid content and any determinate ends. Thus, the disinterestedness 
exhibited by this formal rationality would lack any essential relation to the Kantian notion of a 
pure practical reason that is capable a generating unconditionally valid ends in the form of a 
set of determinate moral duties. In Sade’s novels, the lack of any essential connection between 
                                                          
11 See also the allusion to Kant’s idea that ‘[p]urposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit] can thus exist without an end [ohne 
Zweck]’ (AA 5 [CJ]: 220) in connection with ‘planning considered as an end in itself ’ (DA, 112; DE, 69-70).  
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this formal rationality and morality is demonstrated. Instead of concerning itself with moral 
duties or any other type of moral norm, this formal rationality, whose own organizing and 
systematizing activity has become an end in itself, makes human beings into the material 
objects of planned activities that require treating their own wishes and ends as entirely 
irrelevant. Instead, their bodies become mere things that are to be exploited by an apparently 
sovereign subject to the greatest possible degree in accordance with a plan (‘no moment is 
unused, no body orifice neglected, no function left inactive’), though not for pleasure but 
simply because this use of the bodies of others is required by the system that has been 
consciously and painstakingly planned by the rational subject. In this way, Sade develops the 
practical implications of key aspects of Kant’s theoretical philosophy – that is, reason’s purely 
formal character and how it engages in the activity of organizing its material into a systematic 
whole purely for its own sake – while radically severing the link between reason and the 
concept of morality. His novels thus make explicit the nature of enlightenment reason and they 
in this sense facilitate consciousness of what it essentially is. This achievement secures Sade’s 
status as one of the ‘dark writers of the bourgeoisie’, who ‘unlike its apologists, did not seek to 
avert the consequences of the Enlightenment with harmonistic doctrines’ and ‘did not pretend 
that formalistic reason had a closer affinity to morality than to immorality’ (DA, 141; DE, 92). 
The role played by this idea of a disinterested (but non-moral) formal rationality, which 
engages in the activity of organization purely for its own sake, in Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
account of the essential connection between Kant’s philosophy and the novels of Sade raises a 
problem with the idea that we are here dealing with one and the same reason. For how can 
Horkheimer and Adorno treat reason as both instrumental and non-instrumental in character 
without introducing a fatal ambiguity into their account of how enlightenment rationality 
manifests itself in Kant’s philosophy and then, with regard to its practical implications, in the 
novels of Sade? Given the need to render intelligible the transition from Kant’s philosophy to 
the novels of Sade, addressing this question amounts to showing that both an instrumental form 
of theoretical reason and a non-instrumental form of theoretical reason can be found in Kant’s 
philosophy. In the previous section we saw how an instrumental form of reason can be 
discovered. It now remains to explain the existence of a non-instrumental form of reason of the 
relevant type. One response to the difficulty in question might be to claim that the instrumental 
character of reason and its non-instrumental character map on to the distinction between reason 
in so far as it guides the use of the understanding, on the one hand, and reason in the narrower 
sense of the object and source of the transcendental dialectic, on the other. I shall now explain 
how some of Kant’s own statements concerning speculative reason may suggest a non-
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instrumental form of reason of the relevant type, but that what we have is nevertheless an 
instrumental form of reason. In this case, however, although it is a form of reason that operates 
as the means to an end, it does not do this in such a way as to reduce the activity of reason to 
the systematic organization of a given content which is external to it. Rather, the content is 
internal to reason. 
Let us look first at the evidence for the claim that reason in its speculative use is non-
instrumental in character. In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant maintains that ‘[h]uman reason 
is by nature architectonic’ (CPR, A474/B502). The fact that the drive to attain systematic unity 
is part of the nature of reason explains its drive to attain completeness through the identification 
and demonstration of the complete set of conditions for any conditioned item of knowledge. In 
the absence of this set of conditions, the system of knowledge will remain incomplete, not only 
in terms of its extent but also in terms of the unifying grounds of the various elements of 
knowledge that form its parts. This explanation of the search for completeness does not entail 
the existence of some practical end, even that of self-preservation, that is external to reason 
itself. Rather, if we were to ask the same question that we asked in the case of the understanding 
concerning why reason engages in the activity that it does, the answer would be that there is a 
given drive for systematic knowledge that is internal to reason and that results in an activity in 
which reason engages purely for its own sake. The disinterested nature of this activity is 
stressed by Kant himself, when he claims not only that there is a ‘natural predisposition’ on the 
part of human reason to generate questions that cannot be answered because they arise from a 
use of reason that cannot be validated by experience, but also that this predisposition is 
connected with an employment of reason that is not ‘moved by the mere vanity of knowing it 
all’ (CPR, B21). On the contrary, reason’s attempt to extend its use beyond the boundaries of 
experience requires a type of self-sacrifice in that  
 
the investigations of our reason … we hold to be far more preeminent in their 
importance and sublime in their final aim than everything that the understanding 
can learn in the field of appearances, and on which we would rather venture 
everything, even at the risk of erring, than give up such important investigations 
because of any sort of reservation or from contempt and indifference. (CPR, 
A3/B6-7) 
 
This statement implies that the activity in which reason engages is experienced as something 
intrinsically valuable and to such an extent that the rational subject will be motivated to engage 
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in this activity independently of any prudential considerations, which must, in fact, be 
disregarded. Here, then, we have a form of rationality that does not appear, however implicitly, 
to operate as the means to given, external ends, and this is precisely the form of rationality 
required to render intelligible the transition from Kant’s philosophy to the novels of Sade. Yet 
are such statements, which imply a disinterested, non-instrumental employment of reason, by 
themselves sufficient to justify Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of this transition? 
The fact that they are not sufficient is suggested by Kant’s view of the potential to aid 
the understanding, whose ultimate end is the self-preservation of the subject, possessed by 
reason’s drive to systematic unity. This drive promises to enable reason to achieve ever greater 
systematic unity with regard to its empirical use. In other words, the search for the complete 
set of conditions for any conditioned item of knowledge may lead to the discovery of previously 
neglected concepts or to the recognition of connections between existing concept. Such 
achievements would help produce a systematic unity that must nevertheless remain incomplete 
if the extension of the use of reason beyond the bounds of all possible experience is to be 
avoided. This regulative use of reason is exemplified by the employment of the transcendental 
ideas of the mind as a simple substance, the concept of the world in general and the rational 
concept of God. In this connection, Kant speaks of utility and thereby makes explicit how even 
in its regulative speculative use reason is instrumental in character: 
 
[T]he pure rational concepts of the totality in a synthesis of conditions are 
necessary at least as problems of extending the unity of the understanding, if 
possible, to the unconditioned, and they are grounded in the nature of human 
reason, even if these transcendental concepts lack a suitable use in concreto and 
have no other utility [Nutzen] than to point the understanding in the right 
direction so that it may be thoroughly consistent with itself when it extends itself 
to its uttermost extremes. (CPR, A323/B380).  
 
Here, pure reason in its speculative form is reduced to a means of extending and 
completing, in so far as this is possible, the domain of the understanding. Yet it is not the case, 
that speculative reason engages in this activity in accordance with material ends that are 
external to it. Rather, ‘[p]ure reason is in fact concerned with nothing but itself’ (CPR, 
A680/B708). To this extent, what Kant says about this speculative use of reason may appear 
compatible with the idea that reason engages in an activity in which rational organization has 
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becomes an end in itself. Nevertheless, speculative reason serves the understanding which itself 
serves the drive for self-preservation. 
The value that Kant accords to this speculative employment of reason is in any case 
limited, given the threat posed by any attempt on the part of reason to extend itself beyond the 
bounds of all possible experience. Such an attempt to extend the use of speculative reason 
therefore forms an object of criticism on account of its potentially harmful effects. The critique 
to which pure reason subjects itself in seeking to establish the limits of its legitimate 
employment aims, in particular, to avoid the harmful effects of the type of illegitimate 
extension of reason that Kant associates with metaphysics understood as ‘a wholly isolated 
speculative cognition of reason that elevates itself entirely above all instruction from 
experience’ (CPR, B xiv). This is what Kant calls the ‘negative utility’ of his critique. This 
critique nevertheless also has positive utility, in that it eventually allows for the extension of 
the practical use of reason beyond the bounds of experience, by demonstrating the limited 
competency of theoretical reason and by explaining the contradictions that it inevitably 
generates whenever its use extends beyond its proper bounds, thereby removing the suspicion 
that pure reason must inevitably be in contradiction with itself. Thus, ‘[t]o deny that this service 
of criticism is of any positive utility would be as much as to say that the police are of no positive 
utility because their chief business is to put a stop to the violence that citizens have to fear from 
other citizens, so that each can carry on his own affairs in peace and safety’ (CPR, B xxv).  
This analogy between the critique of reason undertaken by Kant and the role of the 
police in society suggests that the employment of reason is ultimately instrumental in character. 
The critical employment of reason serves to keep the speculative use of reason firmly in check 
but in such a way as to preserves the usefulness that it possesses in relation to the understanding. 
Thus, just as a police force is useful, though only in the negative sense of a necessary evil, 
because it guarantees peace and safety, which are themselves desirable ends because they allow 
citizens to pursue their personal ends without suffering interference from others, the critical 
use of reason is useful because it guards us against the false claims to knowledge that the 
unbridled use of speculative reason is liable to generate. At the same time, speculative reason 
can be allowed to continue to aid the understanding by means of its drive for systematicity, 
while this restriction on its use leaves room for the extension of pure reason in a practical form. 
The disinterested, non-instrumental employment of theoretical reason associated with 
metaphysics, in contrast, is, apart from its regulative function, consigned to the realm of error 
and disorder, where we can hope to encounter only ‘reason’s unfounded groping and frivolous 
wandering about without critique’ (CPR, B xxx-xxxi), and it must therefore be carefully 
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policed by critical reason to ensure cognitive order. Thus, in so far as a non-instrumental 
character can be attributed to the speculative use of reason, it is associated with the type of 
dogmatic metaphysics that is to be abolished by and replaced with a critical metaphysics.  
The speculative use of reason is thereby restricted to a means of gaining increasing, but 
necessarily incomplete, systematic knowledge of the conditions of experience (and of the self-
preservation of the subject), while the critical use of reason is a means of ensuring that the 
bounds of possible knowledge are not overstepped. Moreover, any appeal to a form of reason 
that is so closely tied to a pre-critical metaphysics would require forgetting the part played by 
a corrosive critical rationality in the dialectic of enlightenment, as exemplified in the fragment 
of a history of philosophy presented in the Second Excursus. The practical implications of 
enlightenment reason, both in its critical and purely formal uses, are, however, unmasked by 
Sade rather than by Kant. It is in this sense that Sade, like Nietzsche, remains truer to the idea 
of a critical rationality and the liberating potential of enlightenment reason (DA, 142-143; DE, 
93). This is because Sade helps remove the illusions that human beings have both about 
themselves and about the society in which they live, thus providing the negative conditions of 
a life of truth and freedom from deception. This absence of distortion and illusion represents 
the utopian moment in the writings of Sade and Nietzsche, and as we have seen in the case of 
Sade, it requires destroying the link between a formal notion of reason that may appear 
disinterested in character and morality. However, it is not evident that a non-instrumental form 
of reason of this kind can in fact be found in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Rather, this non-
instrumental form of reason is associated with a pre-critical metaphysics, whereas both the 
critical employment of reason and the speculative employment of reason are understood in 
terms of a concept that implies an instrumental notion of reason, namely, the concept of utility.  
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